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6	and on behalf of all others similarly situated					
7						
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA					
9	FOR THE COUNTY O	F SAN DIEGO				
10	DONALD R. SHORT, JAMES F. GLEASON,)	CASE NO: GIC877707				
11	CASEY MEEHAN, MARILYN SHORT, PATTY) WESTERVELT, AND DOTTIE YELLE,	THIRD AMENDED				
12	individually, and on behalf of all others similarly) situated,	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR: (1) FRAUD AND DECEIT-				
13	Plaintiff,)	INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION;				
14	v. ,	(2) FRAUD AND DECEIT- NEGLIGENT				
15	CC-LA JOLLA, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, CC-	MISREPRESENTATION; (3) FRAUD AND DECEIT-				
16	LA JOLLA, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company, CC-DEVELOPMENT GROUP, INC.,	CONCEALMENT; (4) ELDER ABUSE; (5) VIOLATIONS OF THE				
17	CLASSIC RESIDENCE MANAGEMENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Illinois Limited DOES 1 to 110 inclusion (CLASSIC RESIDENCE MANAGEMENT	CONSUMER LEGAL REMEDIES ACT; (6) BREACH OF FIDUCIARY				
18	Partnership, and DOES 1 to 110, inclusive,	DUTY; (7) UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES; (8) BREACH OF				
19	Defendants.)	CONTRACT; (9) CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD; AND (10) VIOLATION OF				
20)	HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTION 1793.5				
21)					
22						
23	THIS IS A CLASS ACTI	ON LAWSUIT.				
24	1. This is a class action lawsuit brought b	by the plaintiffs, Donald R. Short, James F.				
25	Gleason, Casey Meehan, Marilyn Short, Patty Westervelt, and Dottie Yelle, who are residents of					
26	San Diego, California, and residents of a continuing care retirement community marketed by the					
27	defendants as La Jolla Village Towers ("La Jolla Villa	age Towers"). The plaintiffs bring this suit				
28	on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated pursuant to California					
	Third Amended Class Acti	ion Complaint				

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and/or 1781. The definition of the class is set forth in paragraph 77 of this complaint.

- 2. The defendants operate a continuing care retirement community located at 8515 Costa Verde Boulevard in San Diego, California, known as the La Jolla Village Towers.
- 3. Defendant CC-La Jolla, Inc. ("CC-La Jolla"), is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Diego, California.
- 4. Defendant CC-La Jolla L.L.C. (the "L.L.C.") is a Delaware limited liability corporation with its principal place of business in San Diego, California. The L.L.C. does business as CCW-La Jolla, L.L.C., which entity is not registered with the California Secretary of State.
- 5. Defendant CC-Development Group, Inc. ("Parent"), is a Delaware corporation doing business in San Diego, California. Parent owns a controlling interest in and directs the operations and decisions of all of the other named defendants and of La Jolla Village Towers.
- 6. Defendant Classic Residence Management Limited Partnership, doing business as Classic Residence by Hyatt, an Illinois Limited Partnership ("Classic"), manages the day-to-day operations of La Jolla Village Towers under direction from Parent.
- 7. The defendants market La Jolla Village Towers to elderly persons as "luxury senior living" which provides "the added piece of mind that comes with living in a community that offers additional levels of care," including assisted living and skilled nursing.
- 8. The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, of defendants DOES 1 to 110, inclusive, are unknown to plaintiffs, who therefore sue said defendants by such fictitious names.
- 9. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that each of the defendants designated herein as a DOE is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein referred to, and caused injury and damages proximately thereby to plaintiffs and the plaintiff class as herein alleged. Plaintiffs will seek leave of court to amend this complaint to set forth the true names and capacities of such named defendants when their identities become known to them.
 - 10. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that each defendant named

in this action, including DOE defendants, at all relevant times, was the agent, ostensible agent, servant, employee, representative, assistant, joint venturer, and/or co-conspirator of each of the other defendants, and was at all times acting within the course and scope of his, her, or its authority as agent, ostensible agent, servant, employee, representative, joint venturer, and/or co-conspirator, and with the same authorization, consent, permission or ratification of each of the other defendants.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

- 11. This case involves a massive actual and constructive fraud perpetrated by the defendants against more than 300 vulnerable elderly San Diegans residing at La Jolla Village Towers.
- 12. Through numerous publications, marketing brochures, and oral presentations, the defendants made knowingly false "continuing care promises" to the plaintiffs and the other elderly residents of La Jolla Village Towers.
- 13. These continuing care promises were calculated to induce trust and reliance in the defendants to fulfill lifetime health care promises in exchange for total payments from the plaintiffs and the other residents of La Jolla Village Towers of approximately \$85 million.
- 14. Relying on those promises, La Jolla Village Towers residents—whose average age is approximately 85 years—paid "entrance fees!" ranging from \$218,000 to more than \$700,000 into a trust created by the defendants to be used in part for pre-paid lifetime health care.
- 15. The defendants have exhausted the entire trust fund, including making "cash disbursements" to individual owners of La Jolla Village Towers.
 - 16. None of the \$85 million trust fund remains to be used, as promised, for pre-paid

Health and Safety Code section 1771, subdivision (c)(3) provides: "[e]ntrance fee' means the . . . consideration made or promised to be made by, or on behalf of, a person entering into a continuing care contract for the purpose of assuring care or related services pursuant to that continuing care contract or as full or partial payment for the promise to provide care for the term of the continuing care contract. . . . An initial, amortized, or deferred transfer of consideration that is greater in value than 12 times the monthly care fee shall be presumed to be an entrance fee."

Third Amended Class Action Complaint

material, either written or oral, is a continuing care promise."

- 26. Section 1775, subdivision (e), provides that "[t]his chapter shall be liberally construed for the protection of persons attempting to obtain or receiving continuing care."
- 27. The defendants operate (1) La Jolla Village Towers, a 21-story, 227-unit, "independent living" apartment building, located at 8515 Costa Verde Boulevard, and (2) a "care center" providing assisted living, memory support/Alzheimer's care, and skilled nursing care, located at 4171 Las Palmas Square (the "care center").
- 28. The defendants acquired La Jolla Village Towers, a pre-existing building, on or before April 28, 1998.
- 29. Many of the residents presently living at La Jolla Village Towers were already residents before La Jolla Village Towers was acquired by the defendants.
- 30. Pre-existing residents were required to apply and pay an entrance fee to defendants in order to remain at La Jolla Village Towers.
- 31. Admission to La Jolla Village Towers (and re-admission for already-existing residents residing there before April 28, 1998) begins with acceptance into the independent living apartment building. Admission is limited to persons age 62 or older who pass a physical examination and meet the defendants' income and asset criteria.
- 32. As residents age and require assisted living, memory support, or skilled nursing care, they move from the independent living apartment building to the care center.
- 33. The defendants charge residents in two ways, an "entrance fee" and a "monthly fee."
- 34. Plaintiffs and all residents of La Jolla Village Towers ("residents") pay an entrance fee⁴ upon moving into an independent living apartment.
- 35. The defendants' agents represented to plaintiffs and all residents, both orally and in writing, that a portion of their entrance fee would be held in trust for pre-paid lifetime health

Under certain circumstances, a portion of the entrance fee is refundable. However, the vast majority of entrance fees are never refunded.

care. The defendants's agents told residents that—depending on which of three lifetime health plans are selected by the resident—between 8 percent to 40 percent of the entrance fee was for pre-paid lifetime health care.

- 36. The defendants acknowledge that a resident's non-refundable entrance fee typically comprises a substantial portion of that resident's life savings. Indeed, one of the defendants' marketing brochures state "[m]ost residents use all or a portion of the proceeds from the sale of their home to pay the entrance fee."
- 37. Thus, once the entrance fee is paid in exchange for the promise of lifetime health care, the already vulnerable elderly residents become even more vulnerable, because they typically cannot afford to move out, forfeit their substantial entrance fees, and pay an additional entrance fee to a different CCRC or other nursing home facility.
- 38. Entrance fees are fully refundable for 90 days after residency, and then only partially refundable on a declining schedule over 50 months, at which time the entrance fee for most residents is completely non-refundable. Thus, the longer the defendants are able to entice residents to remain, financial options decrease for the elderly residents.
- 39. In other words, most La Jolla Village Towers residents depend on the defendants to treat them fairly, and have no realistic alternative if they are cheated financially or mistreated.
- 40. The defendants also charge residents a "monthly fee," ranging from \$3,000 to \$5,500.
- 41. The defendants' agents told plaintiffs and residents, both orally and in writing, that (a) monthly fees would include only the operating expenses of the independent living apartment building and would not include any operating expenses (or losses) of the care center; and (b) any future monthly fee increases would be minimized by the defendants' diligent efforts at managing all expenses. Reasonable interest earnings from the trust fund entrance fees would have more than covered the defendants' alleged care center losses. The defendants' written statements included: (1) "[p]lease be assured that we are looking at all our expenses and systems to find ways of reducing the impact of such [monthly fee] increases"; (2) "[p]lease rest assured that we will work diligently to manage expenses and that, as an affiliate of Hyatt Corporation, La Jolla

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Village Towers will reap the benefits of group purchasing volume discounts"; and (3) "we are as sensitive about [monthly fee] increases as you are. We are working diligently to ensure La Jolla Village Towers operates efficiently...."

- 42. Section 1771.8 imposes limits on monthly fee increases, and requires the defendants to share financial information with residents whose input must be considered before any fee increase decision is made. The defendants failed to do this.
- 43. Prospective residents, such as plaintiffs, were attracted by the defendants' advertising and marketing brochures, as well as oral representations from the defendants' agents.
- 44. Every promise made by the defendants' agents, "whether contained in any advertisement, brochure, or other material, either written or oral, is a continuing care promise." (§ 1771, subd. (c)(10).)
- 45. The defendants' continuing care promises included: (1) creating a trust fund for pre-paid lifetime health care, (2) assuring the "high quality"—and lack of additional cost—of that health care, (3) specifying services and facilities which would be provided to residents, (4) expanding the common law covenant of quiet enjoyment, and (5) assuring that the defendants would diligently seek to minimize the necessity of any future monthly fee increases.
 - 46. Each of these continuing care promises has been abandoned by the defendants.
- 47. Defendants also created a "marketing committee" of residents, and requested that these residents accompany defendants' agents to make presentations at meetings of prospective residents. Thus, many of the continuing care promises made to residents, such as in letters and memoranda during residency, were repeated by resident marketing committee residents to elderly

The defendants promised: "[p]erhaps most important of all, La Jolla Village Towers offers . . . the peace of mind that comes from knowing your potential long-term care needs will be expertly met at our on-site care center at virtually no extra cost" and "La Jolla Village Towers residents will be able to move to our on-site care center, offering high-quality assisted living, memory support/Alzheimer's care and skilled nursing care . . . at virtually no increase in their monthly fee." (Italics added.)

Among other things, the defendants promised: "gracious retirement living," "luxury senior living at its finest," "a relaxed, easy going lifestyle," "luxurious surroundings," and "almost unlimited opportunities for relaxation," and peace and quiet.

summoned for more than four hours.

Third Amended Class Action Complaint

The defendants promised that residents of the independent living apartment

specific services and facilities.

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suffer enormously.

- 72. Despite abandoning numerous continuing care promises, the defendants have increased monthly fees charged to residents substantially over the past eight years, and have not diligently managed expenses to minimize monthly fee increases.
- 73. Unknown to residents, on April 28, 1998, the very same day the defendants delivered a memorandum encouraging residents not to leave, stating "[p]lease rest assured that we will work diligently to manage expenses and that, as an affiliate of Hyatt Corporation, La Jolla Village Towers will reap the benefits of group purchasing volume discounts," the defendants entered into a sweetheart 50-year contract with a Hyatt affiliate which effectively allows the defendants' owners to funnel residents' cash to themselves under the guise of "necessary operating expenses."
- 74. For more than nine years, the defendants have charged residents—and paid themselves—management, marketing, and administrative fees and costs in excess of the prevailing market rates.
- 75. Despite statutory, contractual and fiduciary obligations to disclose this and other financial information to residents, the defendants have concealed this information and have steadfastly refused to provide it to the residents.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

- 76. This action is brought under Code of Civil Procedure sections 382 and/or 1781.
- 77. The plaintiff class consists of all past and present residents of the La Jolla Village Towers.
 - 78. This action is properly brought and maintained as a class action because:
 - (a) the questions and issues of law and fact raised are of common and general interest affecting the class;
 - (b) the plaintiff class is estimated to contain in excess of 200 individuals and it is impractical to bring all members of the class individually before the court;
 - (c) each of the members of the class paid the defendants a substantial

"entrance fee," in excess of \$100,000, in exchange for the defendants' promise to provide the plaintiff class "luxury" living accommodations and continuing health care for the remainder of their lives. The entrance fee typically constituted a significant portion of the life savings of each resident, making it impractical for these individuals to relocate to another facility or sue individually.

- (d) the questions of law or fact common to the class are substantially similar and predominate over those questions that affect individual members.
 These common questions include:
 - (i) whether the defendants violated provisions of the Health and Safety

 Code expressly designed for the protection of the plaintiff and the

 plaintiff class;
 - (ii) whether the defendants' representations to residents were false;
 - (iii) whether the defendants have filed false financial statements and provided other false information to the Department of Social Services in order to gain a license to operate the La Jolla Village Towers;
 - (iv) whether the defendants have provided false financial statements and provided other false information to residents in order to justify monthly fee increases;
 - (v) whether the defendants have purposely entered into a number of transactions with related entities in order to obfuscate and carry out a scheme to defraud the residents of La Jolla Village Towers;
 - (vi) whether the plaintiff class is entitled to injunctive relief;
 - (vii) whether the defendants breached a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff class;
 - (viii) whether the plaintiff class is entitled to pre-judgment interest; and
 - (ix) whether the plaintiff class is entitled to attorney fees.

- the claims of the representative plaintiffs are typical of those of the class;
- the representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, have no interests which conflict with the class, and have retained attorneys experienced in the prosecution of class and multi-plaintiff litigation to represent the defined class;
- the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the
 - inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for defendants; or
 - adjudications with respect to some individual members which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications; or
 - adjudications which would substantially impair or impede the ability of individual members to protect their interests;
- a plaintiff class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims presented in this complaint, and will prevent the undue financial, administrative and procedural burdens on the parties and on this Court which individual litigants and litigations would impose.
- Proof of a common or single practice by the defendants will establish the right of each of the members of the plaintiff class to recover on the causes of actions herein alleged.
- The defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole.
- All of the members of the plaintiff class were subject to a systematic course and pattern of practice and were thereby treated by the defendants in a similar manner, as is
 - The plaintiff class is entitled in common to a specific fund with respect to the

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monies paid by or on the behalf of the plaintiff class to the defendants for services in connection with the legal representation of plaintiff class. The plaintiff class is entitled in common to damages for which the defendants are liable. This action is brought for the benefit of the entire class. The representative plaintiffs will expend efforts and expense to prevail in this action from which other members of the plaintiff class will derive benefits. This action will result in the conferral of substantial benefits to the plaintiff class, of both a pecuniary and a non-pecuniary nature.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - FRAUD AND DECEIT INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION

(All Plaintiffs Against All Named Defendants and DOES 11-20)

- 83. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and realleges paragraphs 1 through 82 as though fully set forth herein.
- 84. In numerous publications and advertisements, the defendants made continuing care promises to plaintiffs, within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 1771, subdivision c(10).
- 85. These continuing care promises, or representations, were repeated by the defendants' sales and marketing personnel over several years.
- 86. One such representation was made on April 28, 1998, by Mary G. Leary in her capacity as chief operating officer for one or more of the defendants. In a memorandum addressed to all residents she wrote that the monthly fees charged to residents would only increase if necessary to pay for operating expenses and that residents should "rest assured that [defendants will] work diligently to manage expenses [and keep operating expenses down]." (Exhibit 1 ("Exh. 1").)
- Another such representation was made in August, 1998, by Mary G. Leary in her capacity as chief operating officer for one or more of the defendants. In a memorandum addressed to all residents she wrote that the monthly fees charged to residents would not include any operating losses from the care center. "The Care Center will be treated as a separate entity for budgeting purposes. CC-Development Group, Inc., will fund any shortfalls which occur in the

day-to-day operation of Care Center." (Exh. 2.)

- Another representation was made on December 26, 2001, in a letter to all residents written by James H. Hayes, in his capacity as executive director for one or more of the defendants. In announcing a six percent increase in monthly fees paid by residents, Mr. Hayes informed the residents that "[p]lease be assured that we are looking at all our expenses and systems to find ways of reducing the impact of such increases" (Exh. 3.)
- 89. Another representation was made on November 14, 2000, in a memorandum to all residents written by Carolyn Zuehl, in her capacity as director of accounting for one or more of the defendants. Ms. Zuehl informed the residents that between 8 percent and 23 percent of residents' entrance fees was deductible for income tax purposes because it was for "pre-paid Long Term Care." (Exh. 4.)
- 90. Another representation was made on December 6, 2001, in a memorandum to all residents written by Carolyn Zuehl, in her capacity as director of accounting for one or more of the defendants. Ms Zuehl informed the residents that between 8 percent and 23 percent of residents' entrance fees was deductible for income tax purposes because it was for "pre-paid Long Term Care." (Exh. 5.)
- 91. Another representation was made on February 7, 2003, in a memorandum to all residents from Carolyn Zuehl, in her capacity as director of accounting for one or more of the defendants. Ms Zuehl informed the residents that between 8 percent and 23 percent of residents' entrance fees was deductible for income tax purposes because it was for "pre-paid Long Term Care." (Exh. 6.)
- 92. Another representation was made on February 28, 2007, in a memorandum to all residents from Michael Krieger, executive director for one or more of the defendants, informing residents that 47.73% of any entrance fees paid in 2006, was deductible for pre-paid lifetime health care.
- 93. Another representation made from 1998 through sometime in 2002 in the defendants' marketing brochures provided to all plaintiffs and residents was that "[o]ur wellness center staff [under the supervision of a licensed vocational nurse] is also available around the

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clock to respond to medical emergencies." (Exh. 7.)

- 94. Another representation made by defendants' agents on August 6, 2003, was that "[d]uring non-office hours and on weekends, licensed nurses are on call." (Exh. 8.)
- 95. Each of the plaintiffs' residency agreements expressly states that residents would "receive . . . as part of Your Monthly Fee . . . 'emergency call response, twenty-four (24) hours per day.'"
- 96. Each of the plaintiffs and residents was expressly told in defendants' advertisements and marketing brochures that the living accommodations would be peaceful and quiet, that the living accommodations would be luxurious, and that residents could enjoy an onsite pool, spa and self-parking garage.
- 97. Based on information and belief, the defendants also made numerous representations to plaintiffs, other residents, and the Department of Social Services regarding financial information pertaining to the operation of La Jolla Village Towers and the necessity for increases in the monthly fees paid by plaintiff and other residents to the defendants. These representations included that all operating expenses were reasonable and necessarily incurred by the defendants.
- 98. Another representation was made by defendants in marketing brochures provided to plaintiffs, residents, and prospective residents from 2000 through 2005, which stated: "because La Jolla Village Towers operates as a Continuing Care Retirement Community, residents receive long-term care benefits to help defray the cost of care. Under our continuing care plans, residents will be able to move to our on-site care center, offering high-quality assisted living, memory support/Alzheimer's care, and skilled nursing care if the need should arise, at virtually no increase in their monthly fee." (Exh. 9.) Similar statements were made in defendants internet advertising. (Exhs. 10-12.)
- 99. Another representation made to residents was that "fee increases, if any, will take place once a year. This has been Hyatt's experience with their other [CCRC]. In some cases there has been a refund but no increase over 3 [percent]."
 - 100. Another representation was made in March 2003, in a memorandum to all

residents and prospective residents from Jeff Tipton, director of sales for one or more of the defendants, stating that "[p]erhaps most important of all, La Jolla Village Towers offers a vibrant, active lifestyle with the peace of mind that comes from knowing your potential long-term care needs will be expertly met at our on-site care center at virtually no extra cost." (Exh. 13.)

- 101. The promises and representations described in paragraphs 100 through 113 were false.
- 102. The defendants knew that the promises and representations were false when they made them
- 103. The defendants intended the plaintiffs and other similarly situated residents to rely on these statements and seek admission to La Jolla Village Towers, to remain as residents during the period of time that their entrance fees were refundable, and to pay increases in monthly fees.
- 104. Plaintiffs and other residents of La Jolla Village Towers reasonably relied on these statements to their detriment by applying for admission to La Jolla Village Towers. All plaintiffs and residents relied on the promises and representations to pay substantial entrance fees. All plaintiffs and residents relied on the promises and representations by not seeking refunds of their entrance fees when such refunds were available and in continuing to pay increases in monthly fees.
- 105. Plaintiffs and other residents similarly situated were harmed by the defendants' misrepresentations by paying entrance fees and monthly fees they would not have otherwise paid.
- 106. Plaintiffs' reliance on the defendants' representations was a substantial factor in causing harm to them.
- 107. The conduct of the defendants as described herein, was despicable and was carried on by them with wilful and conscious disregard for the rights of the plaintiffs and other residents similarly situated. The defendants were aware of the probable dangerous consequences of their conduct and wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. This conduct constitutes malice, oppression and fraud such that the plaintiff are entitled pursuant to California Civil Code section 3294 to recover punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and set an example of these defendants.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - FRAUD AND DECEIT

NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

(Against CC-La Jolla, Inc., the L.L.C., and DOES 21-30)

- 108. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege paragraphs 1 through 82 as though fully set forth herein.
- 109. In numerous publications and advertisements, the defendants made continuing care promises to plaintiffs, within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 1771, subdivision c(10).
- 110. These continuing care promises, or representations, were repeated by the defendants' sales and marketing personnel over several years.
- 111. One such representation was made on April 28, 1998, by Mary G. Leary in her capacity as chief operating officer for one or more of the defendants. In a memorandum addressed to all residents she wrote that the monthly fees charged to residents would only increase if necessary to pay for operating expenses and that residents should "rest assured that [defendants will] work diligently to manage expenses [and keep operating expenses down]." (Exh. 1.)
- 112. Another such representation was made in August, 1998, by Mary G. Leary in her capacity as chief operating officer for one or more of the defendants. In a memorandum addressed to all residents she wrote that the monthly fees charged to residents would not include any operating losses from the care center. "The Care Center will be treated as a separate entity for budgeting purposes. CC-Development Group, Inc., will fund any shortfalls which occur in the day-to-day operation of Care Center." (Exh. 2.)
- 113. Another representation was made on December 26, 2001, in a letter to all residents written by James H. Hayes, in his capacity as executive director for one or more of the defendants. In announcing a six percent increase in monthly fees paid by residents, Mr. Hayes informed the residents that "[p]lease be assured that we are looking at all our expenses and systems to find ways of reducing the impact of such increases" (Exh. 3.)
 - 114. Another representation was made on November 14, 2000, in a memorandum to all

residents written by Carolyn Zuehl, in her capacity as director of accounting for one or more of the defendants. Ms. Zuehl informed the residents that between 8 percent and 23 percent of residents' entrance fees was deductible for income tax purposes because it was for "pre-paid Long Term Care." (Exh. 4.)

- 115. Another representation was made on December 6, 2001, in a memorandum to all residents written by Carolyn Zuehl, in her capacity as director of accounting for one or more of the defendants. Ms Zuehl informed the residents that between 8 percent and 23 percent of residents' entrance fees was deductible for income tax purposes because it was for "pre-paid Long Term Care." (Exh. 5.)
- 116. Another representation was made on February 7, 2003, in a memorandum to all residents from Carolyn Zuehl, in her capacity as director of accounting for one or more of the defendants. Ms Zuehl informed the residents that between 8 percent and 23 percent of residents' entrance fees was deductible for income tax purposes because it was for "pre-paid Long Term Care." (Exh. 6.)
- 117. Another representation was made on February 28, 2007, in a memorandum to all residents from Michael Krieger, executive director for one or more of the defendants, informing residents that 47.73% of any entrance fees paid in 2006, was deductible for pre-paid lifetime health care.
- 118. Another representation made from 1998 through sometime in 2002 in the defendants' marketing brochures provided to all plaintiffs and residents was that "[o]ur wellness center staff [under the supervision of a licensed vocational nurse] is also available around the clock to respond to medical emergencies." (Exh. 7.)
- 119. Another representation made by defendants' agents on August 6, 2003, was that "[d]uring non-office hours and on weekends, licensed nurses are on call." (Exh. 8.)
- 120. Each of the plaintiffs' residency agreements expressly states that residents would "receive . . . as part of Your Monthly Fee . . . 'emergency call response, twenty-four (24) hours per day."
 - 121. Each of the plaintiffs and residents were expressly told in defendants'

advertisements and marketing brochures that the living accommodations would be peaceful and quiet, that the living accommodations would be luxurious, and that residents could enjoy an onsite pool, spa and self-parking garage.

- 122. Based on information and belief, the defendants also made numerous representations to plaintiffs, other residents, and the Department of Social Services regarding financial information pertaining to the operation of La Jolla Village Towers and the necessity for increases in the monthly fees paid by plaintiff and other residents to the defendants. These representations included that all operating expenses were reasonable and necessarily incurred by the defendants.
- 123. Another representation was made by defendants in marketing brochures provided to plaintiffs, residents, and prospective residents from 2000 through 2005, which stated: "because La Jolla Village Towers operates as a Continuing Care Retirement Community, residents receive long-term care benefits to help defray the cost of care. Under our continuing care plans, residents will be able to move to our on-site care center, offering high-quality assisted living, memory support/Alzheimer's care, and skilled nursing care if the need should arise, at virtually no increase in their monthly fee." (Exh. 9.) Similar statements were made in defendants internet advertising. (Exhs. 10-12.)
- 124. Another representation made to residents was that "fee increases, if any, will take place once a year. This has been Hyatt's experience with their other [CCRCs]. In some cases there has been a refund but no increase over 3 [percent]."
- 125. Another representation was made in March 2003, in a memorandum to all residents and prospective residents from Jeff Tipton, director of sales for one or more of the defendants, stating that "[p]erhaps most important of all, La Jolla Village Towers offers a vibrant, active lifestyle with the peace of mind that comes from knowing your potential long-term care needs will be expertly met at our on-site care center at virtually no extra cost." (Exh. 13.)
- 126. The promises and representations described in paragraphs 124 to 138 were not true.
 - 127. The defendants had no reasonable grounds for believing the representations were

true when they made them.

- 128. The defendants intended the plaintiffs and other similarly situated residents to rely on these statements and seek admission to La Jolla Village Towers.
- 129. Plaintiffs and other residents of La Jolla Village Towers reasonably relied on these statements to their detriment by applying for admission to La Jolla Village Towers. All plaintiffs and residents relied on the promises and representations to pay substantial entrance fees. All plaintiffs and residents relied on the promises and representations by not seeking refunds of their entrance fees when such refunds were available.
- 130. Plaintiffs and other residents similarly situated were harmed by the defendants' misrepresentations by paying entrance fees and monthly fees they would not have otherwise paid.
- 131. Plaintiffs' reliance on the defendants' representations was a substantial factor in causing harm to them.

THIRD OF ACTION - FRAUD AND DECEIT CONCEALMENT

(All Plaintiffs Against All Named Defendants and DOES 31-40)

- 132. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege paragraphs 1 through 82 as though fully set forth herein.
- 133. The defendants intentionally failed to disclose material facts to plaintiffs and others similarly situated and those facts were known only to the defendants. Those facts included:
 - a. On April 28, 1998, the very same day the defendants delivered a memorandum encouraging residents not to leave, stating "[p]lease rest assured that we will work diligently to manage expenses and that, as an affiliate of Hyatt Corporation, La Jolla Village Towers will reap the benefits of group purchasing volume discounts," the defendants entered into a sweetheart 50-year contract with a Hyatt affiliate which effectively allows the defendants' owners to funnel residents' cash to themselves under the guise of "necessary operating expenses";
 - b. That one of the "necessary operating expenses" defendants charge plaintiffs as part

similarly situated. The defendants were aware of the probable dangerous consequences of their conduct and wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. This conduct constitutes malice, oppression and fraud such that the plaintiff are entitled pursuant to California Civil Code section 3294 to recover punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and set an example of these defendants.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - ELDER ABUSE

(All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants and DOES 41-50)

- 141. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and realleges paragraphs 1 through 82, 84 through 107, 109 through 131, and 133 through 140, as though fully set forth herein.
- 142. Defendants appropriated and retained the property of plaintiffs and others similarly situated, namely, entrance fees and monthly fees.
- 143. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were over 65 of age at the time of the defendants' conduct.
- 144. The defendants appropriated and retained plaintiffs' property for wrongful use and or with an intent to defraud in violation of Welfare and Institutions Code sections 15610.07 and 15610.30.
- 145. The use was wrongful because none of the approximately \$80 million paid to defendants in entrance fees was set aside to pay for pre-paid lifetime health care and a large portion of the monthly fees were a scheme by the defendants to defraud money from the plaintiffs and other residents under the false claim of necessary operating expenses.
- 146. The defendants' use was with an intent to defraud because the defendants never planned on setting aside any portion of the entrance fees to pay for lifetime health care, and instead intended to take the entrance fees and monthly fee increases for their own use. Further, the defendants knew that they were paying themselves exorbitant management fees, commissions, marketing fees and administrative expenses and deceiving the elderly plaintiffs and other residents that monthly fees and monthly fee increases were necessary and proper.
- 147. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were harmed by the defendants' deception, and such harm includes mental suffering withing the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code

provisions with regard to the following transactions:

- a. Representing that the health care provided in the care center is of "high quality" and "expert." In fact, the care provided is substandard because: (a) many care providers do not understand or speak English fluently, (b) the training, supervision and care provided in the care center is below the standard of care, and (c) defendants are understaffed.
- b. Representing that entrance fees paid by independent living residents would be used to fund pre-paid lifetime health care. In fact, none of the entrance fees have been set aside to be used for this purpose.
- c. Representing that independent living residents could move to the care center with no extra cost, except the cost of one additional meal per day. Instead, residents who move from defendants' independent living facility to the care center have been charged substantial additional costs for the care they receive, such as nursing care, because the nurses provided by defendants are unable to communicate effectively in English.
- d. Representing that monthly fees charged to residents in the independent living facility would not include any operating loss of the care center. Instead, defendants have charged the operating losses of the care center to monthly fees assessed to independent living residents.
- e. Representing the availability of 24-hour emergency medical response to the residents of the independent living facility and that the wellness center staff is available to independent living residents "around the clock to respond to medical emergencies." Neither of these vital continuing care promises are being fulfilled.
- f. Representing that La Jolla Village Towers would provide "gracious retirement living," "luxury senior living at its finest," "a relaxed, easy going lifestyle," "luxurious surroundings," and "almost unlimited opportunities for relaxation," and peace and quiet. In fact, due to the manner in which defendants have engaged in construction of a new high-rise on the property, the living environment is

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extremely noisy, dusty, cold, and disruptive. Moreover, numerous important
health-related facilities, such as the indoor swimming pool and the exercise room
have been eliminated or reduced.

- g. Representing that defendants would "work diligently to manage expenses," that residents would "reap the benefits of group purchasing," and that residents could "rest assured that [you] are looking at all of [your] expenses and systems to find ways of reducing the impact of [monthly fee] increases." Instead, defendants have entered into transactions with related parties for expenses such as management, marketing, and administration that are well above market rates for those expenses in order to gouge elderly residents with unnecessary monthly fees and conceal defendants' practice as simply passing along normal operating expenses.
- 153. Each of the plaintiffs for this cause of action complied with the notice requirements of Civil Code section 1782, subdivision (a).
- 154. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated, who are entitled to additional statutory protection due to their age (Civ. Code § 1780, subd. (b)) were harmed by the defendants' violations.
- 155. Plaintiffs' reliance on defendants' representations was a substantial factor in causing harm to them.
- by them with wilful and conscious disregard for the rights of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated. The defendants were aware of the probable dangerous consequences of their conduct and wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. This conduct constitutes malice, oppression and fraud such that the plaintiffs are entitled pursuant to California Civil Code section 3294 to recover punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and set an example of these defendants.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (All Plaintiffs Against All Named Defendants and DOES 61-70)

157. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and paragraph 1 through 82, 84 through 107,

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159. A de facto fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence existed between the defendants and the plaintiffs and others similarly situated as a result of the following facts:

as a result of their advanced age, the plaintiffs and others similarly situated are

vulnerable persons⁸;

(a)

- (b) by offering and entering into continuing care contracts with the plaintiffs and others similarly situated, the defendants solicited and accepted control over the plaintiffs, by agreeing to provide them with shelter, food, and health care for the rest of their lives;
- (c) the defendants encouraged the plaintiffs and others similarly situated to repose trust and confidence in the defendants by making representations such as, "[twenty-three percent]

158. The defendants created an original Master Trust Agreement in which First Union National Bank, or its successor, was the trustee. Under the Master Trust Agreement, the defendants had the right to borrow trust funds at no interest to themselves. Acting as agents for the trustee, the defendants encouraged the plaintiffs and others similarly situated to execute, as grantors, documents entitled Joinder in Master Trust Agreement ("Joinders") under which the plaintiffs and others similarly situated agreed to contribute money to the Master Trust and be bound by the Master Trust Agreement. In soliciting the Joinders on behalf of the trustees and themselves, the defendants failed to provide the plaintiffs and others similarly situated with copies of the Master Trust Agreement, failed to fairly disclose the terms of that trust, and misrepresented that the terms of the Master Trust included provisions that would guarantee that portions of the funds contributed to the trust would be retained to provide for the lifetime health care of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated. By soliciting the Joinders, a de jure fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence existed between the defendants, as agents for the trustee, and the plaintiffs and others similarly situated, as beneficiaries.

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The Legislature has expressly recognized this disparity in enacting various protective legislation. (See., e.g., Conservatorship of Kayle (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 ["legislative purpose of [Elder Abuse Act] is to afford extra protection to vulnerable portion of population"]; Welfare & Inst. Code, § 15600; Health & Saf. Code, 1770; Civ. Code, §§ 1780, subd. (b)(1), 3345.)

of your total entrance fee paid is considered to be for pre-paid Long Term Care, as well as the entire \$18,000 for the second person covered;" "[t]he entrance fee includes . . . the promise of temporary or long-term care in our . . . care center;"; and "[t]he most important element of retirement living is your health and the peace of mind that comes from knowing your potential long-term care needs will be met";

- (d) as a result of their agreement to enter into continuing care contracts with the defendants and become residents of La Jolla Village Towers, the plaintiffs and others similarly situated are vulnerable, because they are dependent on the defendants to provide them with shelter, food, and health care for the rest of their lives;
- (e) because the plaintiffs and others similarly situated paid substantial entrance fees which are only partially refundable after 90 days and non-refundable after 50 months, they cannot readily enter into alternative continuing care contracts; they cannot protect themselves; and they are financially vulnerable to the defendants;
- (f) the plaintiffs reposed trust and confidence in the defendants to perform their continuing care promises; and
- (g) there is an unequal relationship between parties in which the plaintiffs and others similarly situated have surrendered control to the defendants because of the trust and confidence which they reposed in the defendants.
- other similarly situated by, among other things, diverting trust assets for their own benefit, loaning trust assets without interest, violating statutes which establish mandatory procedures for raising monthly fees, failing to disclose to plaintiffs and others similarly situated the true costs of the services being provided, using related entities to supply promised services at costs above market, excessively increasing monthly fees, failing to provide promised health care services, and failing to adequately secure their continuing care obligations.
- 161. The defendants' breaches of fiduciary duty were substantial factors in causing harm to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated, in amounts to be proved at trial.
 - 162. The conduct of defendants as described herein, was despicable and was carried on

by them with wilful and conscious disregard for the rights of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated. The defendants were aware of the probable dangerous consequences of their conduct and wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. This conduct constitutes malice, oppression and fraud such that the plaintiff are entitled pursuant to California Civil Code section 3294 to recover punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and set an example of these defendants.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION - BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200 (All Plaintiffs Against All Named Defendants and DOES 71-80)

- 163. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege paragraphs 1 through 82, 84 through 107, 109 through 131, 133 through 140, 151 through 156, and 158 through 162, as though fully set forth herein.
- 164. By committing the violations of statute and other unlawful acts set forth herein, the defendants have engaged in unfair competition.
- 165. These violations and unlawful acts have harmed the plaintiffs and others similarly situated, and this harm outweighs the utility of defendants' business practices, which therefore constitute an unfair business act or practice within the meaning of Business and Professions Code sections 17200.
- 166. Plaintiffs seek both full restitution, including a refund of their entrance fees and their monthly fees, with pre-judgment interest.
- 167. To prohibit future statutory violations and unlawful acts, plaintiffs seek an injunction be issued against defendants enjoining such violations and unlawful acts.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION - BREACH OF CONTRACT (All Plaintiffs Against All Named Defendants and DOES 81-90)

- 168. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege paragraphs 1 through 82, 84 through 107, 109 through 131, 133 through 140, 151 through 156, and 158 through 162, as though fully set forth herein.
- 169. Each of the plaintiffs entered into a continuing care contract, as defined by section 1771, subdivision (c)(8), with the defendants.

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The continuing care contract consisted of several "continuing care promises," as

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continuing care contracts.

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"In its generic sense, constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions and concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, and resulting in damages to another. [Citations.] Constructive fraud exists in cases in which conduct, although not actually fraudulent, ought to be so treated—that is, in which such conduct is a constructive or quasi fraud, having all the actual consequences and all the legal effects of actual fraud.' [Citation.] Constructive fraud usually arises from a breach of duty where a relation of trust and confidence exists. [Citation.] Confidential and fiduciary relations are in law, synonymous and may be said to exist whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in another." (Barrett v. Bank of America (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1362, 1368-1369.)

- 179. The previously alleged acts and omissions of the defendants constitute constructive fraud.
- 180. As a result of the defendants' constructive fraud, the defendants have unlawfully profited by using trust funds and unlawful monthly fee increases for their own benefit and caused the plaintiffs and others similarly situated to suffer damages, in amounts to be proved at trial.
- by them with wilful and conscious disregard for the rights of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated. The defendants were aware of the probable dangerous consequences of their conduct and wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. This conduct constitutes malice, oppression and fraud such that the plaintiffs are entitled pursuant to California Civil Code section 3294 to recover punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and set an example of these defendants.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION - VIOLATIONS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTION 1793.5

(All Plaintiffs Against All Named Defendants and DOES 101-110)

182. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege paragraphs 1 through 82,84 through 107, 109 through 131, and 133 through 140, 151 through 156, and 158 through 162, 169 through 175, and 177 through 181, as though fully set forth herein.

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Jury trial demanded.